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prisoners. Further, the existing status of the public defender as a county officer
is, for the present purpose, undesirable, as the problem is essentially one requiring state administration.
The matter could be more adequately handled, as it has been in Indiana,30
through the office of a state public defender expressly charged with the duty of
representing indigent prisoners who claim unconstitutional detention. A bill
basically similar to the Indiana act was introduced in the Illinois House of
Representatives in 1945. Under the proposed legislation, two experienced criminal lawyers, appointed by the state Supreme Court, were to be permanently
employed as legal counsel for prisoners in the state penitentiary.3' The bill also
proposed that $4o0,o be made available to the Supreme Court for "administrative expenses." Although actively supported, the bill unfortunately never
became law.
Actually any arrangement would be acceptable by which prisoners seeking
relief from unconstitutional detention would be assured competent representation, and by which the courts could give adequate consideration to the merits of
each petition. Either of the above methods would be desirable only if they were
conscientiously carried out by those charged with the duty. Intelligent legislation dealing with the matter must insure such capable administration. It is a
primary duty of the next Illinois General Assembly to take appropriate action.

SEARCHES AND SEIZURES: 1948
The backwash of recent cases which swept away a small but significant fraction of the protection hitherto afforded by the Fourth Amendment' appears to
have run its course. Whatever rationale may account for the decisions in Davis
29The present public defender statute applies only to Cook County. Ill. Rev. Stat. (1947)
c. 34, § i63c. Even if all counties were provided for, however, the same objections would be
present.
3In
Indiana it is now the duty of the public defender, appointed by the state Supreme
Court, to represent prisoners who are paupers "in any matter in which such person may assert
he is unlawfully or illegally imprisoned, after his time for appeal shall have expired." Ind. Stat.
Ann. (Bums, Supp., 1945) § 13-1402.

3' The proposed bill fixed the salaries of the attorneys at $7,500 per annum. The two appointees were to be required, in addition to aiding prisoners directly, to perform such other
duties as the Supreme Court judges might direct. Ill. H.B. 534, 64th Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Tabled June 28, 1945).

1"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."

NOTES

v. United States,2 Zap v. United States,3 and Harrisv. United States4---all widely
regarded as dealing serious blows to civil liberties---seems to have vanished in
the two recent opinions in which the Supreme Court has refused to sanction the
extension of the permissive peacetime limits of police activity. In United States
v. Di Re6 the Court held that the presence of a third party in an automobile with
persons who were there engaged in a conspiracy to sell counterfeit gasoline ration
coupons did not in itself afford reasonable grounds to arrest and search the
third party without a warrant. And in United States v. Johnson7 a divided

Court reaffirmed its historic hostility to search of a private dwelling without a
magistrate's writ. Because of manifest differences in fact situations, an attempt
to discover a definitive trend in the Court's recent interpretations of the Fourth
Amendment would be treacherous; but it is noteworthy that the philosophy of
dissent in the Harrisand Davis decisions has found expression in the opinion of
the majority in the two later cases. Taken together, the five recent search and
seizure pronouncements of the Court reaffirm in striking fashion how subtle con2 328 U.S. 582 (1946). The defendant, president of a corporation which maintained a gasoline filling station in New York City, was suspected of running a black market in gasoline. Two
federal agents, who had no search or arrest warrants, drove their autos into the station and
purchased gas from an attendant without ration stamps. The attendant was arrested, and
while she was being questioned the petitioner returned to the station. He was arrested, and
the officers demanded ration coupons covering the aggregate amount of the sales. The defendant
assured the agents that he had sufficient coupons to cover the shortage which an examination
of the ration depositories attached to the tanks had revealed. The officers demanded
to see the coupons which the defendant said were locked in an inner room of the station,
and after at first refusing he unlocked the door and delivered the coupons which formed
the basis of the conviction. It was held that the defendant consented to the search, and that
the permissive limits of police activity are greater where the object of the search is public
property in the custody of a citizen as distinguished from private documents in his possession.
3 328 U.S. 624 (1946). The defendant was under contract to do experimental work for the
navy. Pursuant to the contract and the Second War Powers Act his books were being audited
at his place of business. One of the auditors, a federal agent, demanded and was given by one
of the defendant's employees a cancelled check, later used in evidence over the defendant's
objection, in a prosecution for defrauding the government. By accepting the contract, it was
held, the defendant waived the claim to privacy which he might normally assert, and the
seizure was lawful.
467 S. Ct. 1098 (x947). Federal officers, under authority of an arrest warrant charging use
of the mails to defraud, arrested defendant in his apartment. Although they bad no search
warrant, they explored the premises for about five hours and near the conclusion of the
search one of the agents discovered in a bureau drawer an envelope which when opened revealed a number of selective service cards. The defendant was convicted for possession of draft
cards in violation of the Selective Service Act. The seizure of government property, the possession of which is a crime, was declared lawful even though the officers were not aware when
the search was instituted that such property was hidden on the premises.

s See the dissenting opinions of Justice Frankfurter in Davis v. United States, 328 U.S.
582, 594 (1946), and of Justice Murphy in Harris v. United States, 67 S. Ct. IO98, 1113 (I947);

see also Frank, The United States Supreme Court: 1946-47, 15 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 25 (i947);
Fraenkel, The Supreme Court and Civil Rights: 1946 Term, 47 Col. L. Rev. 955, 959 (1947).
668 S. Ct. 222 (1948).

768 S. Ct. 367 (1948).-

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

struction of the clause has become, 8 and how complex civil liberties can turn out
to be on the casuistic level.
Although the Court has had occasion to speak more than fifty times on the
Fourth Amendment, none of its previous opinions has directly addressed the
question presented by United States v. Di Re. An investigator of the Office of
Price Administration was informed by one Reed that a certain Buttitta was
selling counterfeit gasoline ration coupons, and that he would sell them to Reed
at a named place in Buffalo, New York, on the afternoon of April 14, 1944. The
investigator and a Buffalo police detective trailed Buttitta's automobile and
came upon it parked at the appointed place. The officials went to the car and
found the informer, Reed, in the back seat holding two coupons, and Buttitta
in the driver's seat, Di Re beside him. Asked where he had obtained the coupons,
Reed pointed to Buttitta. All three were taken into custody. At the police station Di Re, in compliance with an order to empty his pockets, produced two
coupons, which, together with one hundred inventory coupons subsequently
discovered in an envelope between his shirt and underwear, were proved counterfeit. He was indicted for knowingly possessing counterfeit gasoline ration
coupons, the evidence seized at the police station was introduced over his
objection, and he was convicted and sentenced to a year in prison and a $ioo
fine. The conviction was reversed by the circuit court, 9 and the reversal was sustained by the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Vinson and Justice Black dissenting
without opinion.
It is no longer questioned that an arrest may be made without a warrant
under certain circumstances, ° and that as an incident to a lawful arrest the
officers may search the person arrested." Legislation authorizing the use of a
search warrant as a general instrument in detecting crime was adopted by
Congress during the first World War,' 2 but there are no statutes creating a
general rule'for arrests made without a warrant. 3 The Government contended
that the validity of an arrest for a federal crime made without a warrant is a
question of federal law to be determined by a uniform rule applicable to all
federal courts. But in consonance with the doctrine that there is no federal
8See, for example, the twenty-six-case chart prepared by Justice Frankfurter as an appendix to his dissent in United States v. Harris, 67 S. Ct. iog8, 1121 (1947), which treats of just
one phase of the law of searches and seizures.
9 Di Re v. United States, i59 F. 2d 8M8 (C.C.A. 2d, 1947).
10See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, i56 (X924); i Stephen, History of the
Criminal Law of England 192 (1883); American Law Institute, Code of Criminal Procedure
§ 21 (1931).

11See People v. Chiagles, 237 N.Y. 193, 142 N.E. 583 (1923). But cf. Trupiano v. United
States, 16 U.S.L. Week 4589 (1948), in which the United States Supreme Court declared the
seizure of contraband made during an arrest without a warrant (lawful because the crime had

been committed in the presence of the arresting officers) unreasonable because the officers had
advance knowledge sufficient to support issuance of a search warrant.
"40
'3

Stat. 228 (1917), 18 U.S.C.A. § 6x et seq. (1927).
222, 226 (1948).

United States v. Di Re, 68 S. Ct.
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common law of crimes, the Court rejected the contention and held that the law
of the jurisdiction-New York--determines the validity of the arrest.
In contrast to the great majority of states, the New York Criminal Code14
requires absolute knowledge that a felony has been committed as a precondition
to a lawful arrest. The officers, of course, had no such knowledge as to Di Re
prior to the arrest. Because arrest without a warrant is permissible in New York
if the offense is committed in the presence of the officer, New York courts have
evolved an unusually loose definition of "presence" to shield policemen from
civil suits for false arrest and malicious prosecution.' s In a leading New York
lower court case 6 an officer noted an individual standing at an intersection at
midnight, and when the officer approached, the individual walked away. The
officer ordered him to stop, searched him, and discovered a concealed weapon.
It was held that a misdemeanor had been committed in the officer's presence
and that the arrest was lawful. Even assuming, however, that the New York
Code permits an arrest on reasonable belief that, a felony has been committed,
the Court held the presence of Di Re in the automobile afforded no basis for
such a belief.
In the great majority of jurisdictions where absolute knowledge that a felony
has been committed is not essential, the requirement of reasonable belief as a
condition precedent to an arrest without a warrant would be satisfied if the
officer notified the person arrested at the time of the arrest, and before the
search, of the offense with which he is being charged." Such in fact is the law
in New York,," and some members of the majority in the Di Re decision sought
to invalidate the arrest on the failure of the arresting officers to comply with that
requirement.
The fact that the arrest and search in the Di Re case were made by state
officers is of course immaterial. Although the Fourth Amendment is not applicable to the states, 9 and evidence seized by a private person" or state officer
X4
N.Y. Crim. Code (McKinney, 1945) § 177. New York has no proviso analogous to

§ 21(d) of the model criminal code prepared by the American Law Institute and widely

adopted, whereby an officer is authorized to arrest without a warrant where he has reasonable
grounds to believe that a felony is being committed.
s Defects in the New York law of arrest are examined in Miller, Arrest Without a Warrant
by a Peace Officer in New York, 21 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 61 (1946).
,6 People v. Esposito, i8 N.Y. Misc. 867, 194N.Y. Supp. 326 (1922); cf. People v. Didonna,
124 N.Y. Misc. 872, 21o N.Y. Supp. 135 (1925).
X7Christie v. Leachinsky, [1946 ] 1 K.B. 124 (policeman, who makes an arrest without
warrant on reasonable suspicion of felony sufficient to justify arrest, but who fails to inform
arrestee of the nature of charge, may be liable for false imprisonment); see American Law
Institute, Code of Criminal Procedure § 25 (i931).
I&N.Y. Crim. Code (McKinney, i945) § i8o.

19Adamson v. California, 67 S. Ct. 1672 (1947); National Safe Deposit v. Stead, 232 U.S.
58 (1914); Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall (U.S.) 36 (1873).
2o Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921) (papers stolen from defendant's office by
private detectives and delivered to federal authorities held admissible).
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is admissible in a federal criminal prosecution21 even though seized wrongfully
according to standards applicable to federal officials, it is well recognized that
such evidence will not be received where there was actual participation by a
federal officer2 or where the state officer acted on behalf of the federal govern23

ment.

The government's contention that Di Re was a participant in a conspiracy
taking place within the officer's presence is persuasive but dangerous. It is indisputable that the same quantum of proof necessary to justify a conviction is not
essential to justify an arrest.2 4 Thus, arrests based upon hearsay evidence have
frequently been upheld.2S Nevertheless, such a test would be at least an implicit
recognition that "association" is sufficient to justify reasonable belief that a
party is guilty of a felony, and could easily become a step toward infringement
of the principle of personal guilt as the basis of punishment.
The law of arrest is ancillary to the general law of searches and seizures, and
the more intimate relation of the Di Re opinion to the Fourth Amendment is
indicated by the Court's discussion in disposing of the Government's assertion
that the arrest was justified as a lawful incident to a search of a motor vehicle
reasonably believed to be carrying contraband. During the Prohibition era
Congress authorized the search of automobiles without a warrant where officers
had reason to believe that the vehicle was being employed in connection with a
violation of the Volstead Act.26 The rationale of the statute, which, when declared valid in Carrollv. United States2 7 was recognized as an exception to the
general prohibition of search of private property without a warrant, is of course
the impracticality of obtaining a writ to search a speeding automobile. A similar
practice had long been recognized in the search of vessels at sea suspected of concealing goods in violation of the revenue laws.28 The government in the Di Re
case sought to extend the implications of the statute to permit search of all
occupants of the vehicle as well as of the automobile itself, but the contention
was overruled. Indeed, there is a strong suggestion in the Di Re opinion that the
statutory exception created under the Volstead Act was intended to be limited
to enforcement of that statute, and that without express congressional authori29
zation, moving vehicles may not be the subject of a search without a warrant.
2'Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (evidence illegally seized by federal marshal
inadmissible, but evidence taken by state policeman at another time in an equally unlawful
manner admitted).

- Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927).
Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927).
34 See United States v. Heitner,
F. 2d 1o5 (C.C.A. 2d, 1945).
Is Perkins, The Law of Arrest, 25 Iowa L. Rev. 201, 238 (1940); Dax and Tibbs, Arrest,
23
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Search and Seizure i7 (1946); United States v. Heitner, 149 F. 2d io5 (C.C.A. 2d, 1945).
2641 Stat. 3x5 (919),
27 U.S.C.A. §40 (1927).
27267 U.S. 132 (1924); cf. Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1932).
28 See United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927).
29 United States v. Di Re, 68 S. Ct. 222, 224 (1948).
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United States v. Johnson exhibits the same hostility to search without a warrant. A lieutenant of the Seattle police narcotics detail received information
from a confidential informer that unknown persons were smoking opium in a
downtown Seattle hotel. The officer, accompanied by two federal narcotics
agents, went to the hotel and, standing outside the designated room, at once
recognized the strong and distinctive odor of burning opium. The Seattle officer
rapped on the door and requested admittance. There were sounds of some one
scurrying about in the room, after which the door was opened. The defendant,
upon inquiry, denied the presence of the opium fumes, whereupon she was informed that she was under arrest and a search for evidence of the opium was
instituted. An opium smoking outfit and opium were found under the bed
covers, and opium was discovered in a suit case. The defendant was indicted for
violation of the revenue laws, the evidence introduced over her motion to suppress, and she was found guilty and sentenced to eighteen months in prison and a
five-hundred-dollar fine. Her conviction was affirmed by the circuit court 3 but
was reversed by the Supreme Court, four justices dissenting without opinion.
History and precedent support a presumption against any search of a
dwelling without a warrant. "The search of a private dwelling without a warrant
is, in itself, unreasonable and abhorrent in our laws."' 3 In instances of doubt,
however, the controlling consideration appears to be the practicality of obtaining a warrant. This was a decisive factor in permitting the search of vessels and
moving vehicles without benefit of a writ. It was undoubtedly a prime consideration in sanctioning the extension of the permissive limits of a search incident to an arrest beyond the person to proofs or implements of the crime
which are plainly discernible and accessible to the arresting officer. 32 And it was
determinative in Taylor v. United States,33 where officers smelled the odor of
whiskey near the garage of a person who had long been suspect. Looking through
a crack in the door thd officers saw a number of boxes and materials, indicative
of a violation of the Volstead Act. They saw no one inside committing the
offense. The entering and search were held illegal without a warrant, the Court
noting that there was abundant opportunity to obtain a magistrate's authorization.34 The evidence in the Johnson case was clearly adequate to justify
the issuance of a warrant, and the slight delay necessitated by the execution of a
writ would not have seriously hampered the officers. It is of course debatable
whether in fact recourse to a magistrate is an effective bulwark against unrea30 Johnson

v. United States, 162 F. 2d 562 (C.C.A. 9th, 1947).

3t Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 32 (1925).
32 See Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927), limited by Go-Bart Importing Co. v.
United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931), and United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932).
3 286 U.S. 1 (1932).
34 Compare Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925) (government agent watching at a
window saw defendants selling narcotics; entry of house and subsequent search without a
warrant held justified as incident to an arrest).
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sonable searches, although the Court has ordered a number of reversals because
of fatal defects in warrants.35 Nonetheless, the constitutional mandate as to
the requirement of a warrant is explicit, and may prevent some instances of
police abuse.
In the light of Harrisv. United States, the silence of the Court in the Johnson
case on the extent of the search is worth noting. The vehement dissents of Justices Frankfurter and Murphy in the Harrisdecision were based on a distinction
between a search and a seizure, and hostility to the extensiveness of the quest.
A search implies an uncertainty which remains to be resolved, whereas a seizure
refers to the actual taking of the evidence or fruits of the crime. Thus it is
unconstitutional to seize evidentiary papers, although the search may be
proper.36 By the same token it is unlawful to make an improper search for
articles appropriate to seizure, i.e., the search for the liquor in UnitedStates v.
Taylor. Authority to search the premises where the arrest occurs has always
been sharply restricted. In a series of three Prohibition cases, the Court explored the extent to which such a search could be made, and concluded that
only visible and accessible evidence could be seized.37 In neither the Harrisnor
the Johnson cases was the contraband within plain sight of the officers, and
before the Harrisopinion such seizures would clearly have been unlawful. The
two cases are nevertheless clearly distinguishable. In United States v. Harristhe
entry of the officers onto the premises, armed as they were with an arrest
warrant, was indisputably lawful. But in the Johnson opinion, the Court declared the entry unlawful. Discussion of the subsequent search was thus rendered unnecessary to disposition of the cause. It is interesting to speculate
whether a lawful entry in the Johnson case, followed by the "rummaging and
ransacking" which took place, would have evoked the same emphatic protest
from Justices Frankfurter, Murphy, and Jackson as the intensive five-hour
search in the Harriscase.
Each of the search and seizure pronouncements of the Court presents anew
the dramatic conflict of policy embodied by the rule which excludes evidentiary
material seized in contravention of the Fourth Amendment. The federal rule is
a radical departure from the. common law38 and since its inception has been a
target of sharp and persistent criticism. The doctrine has been attacked as
35Warrants defective because of absence of facts indicating probable cause: Nathanson v.
United States, 290 U.S. 41 (1933); Grau v. United States, 287 U.S. 124 (1932); Byars v.
United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927). Defective because statutory time limit expired: Sgro v.
United States, 287 U.S. 2o6 (1932). Defect as to oath: Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. r
(1927).
36

Gouled v. United States,

255 U.S.

298 (1921).

See cases cited in note 3o, supra.
38 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2183 (3d ed., 1940). The federal rule of exclusion is derived from
the link between the Fourth Amendment and the privilege against self-incrimination, forged
in United States v. Boyd, x16 U.S. 616 (1886). For a detailed historical account of the relationship between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments see Corwin, The Supreme Court's Interpretation of the Self-Incrimination Clause, 29 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 191 (1930).
37
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making an undue concession to the interests of accused persons as against the
interests of the public in the detection and punishment of crime.39 Wignore has
charged that the rule is a product of "misguided sentimentality" and constitutes
a "coddling of the law evading classes of the population."4o He contends that it
is illogical in that it results in the freeing of two wrongdoers: the accused and
the overzealous police officer who has violated the petitioner's constitutional
rights. Critics point to the existence of the common-law remedies of false arrest
and malicious prosecution as adequate protection against police oppression,4'
and urge that officers guilty of illegal searches and seizures be made liable to
fine or imprisonment. It has been noted that the text of the Amendment makes
no reference to the admissibility of evidence procured through violations of its
provisions, and it is argued that historically the purpose of the search and
seizure clause was to restrain Congress from authorizing general warrants or
from legalizing unreasonable searches by denying the injured party a cause of
action for the trespass. 42 It is contended that the rule shackles effective law
enforcement. 3 And opponents of the Court's position have said that there is no
evidence of greater police abuse or more serious infringement of civil liberties
in those states which permit the introduction of evidence illegally obtained than
in those states which do not.
Justification of the federal rule is largely based on the view that the exclusion
of evidence is the only practical method of giving force to the letter and intent
of the Fourth Amendment. Analogy is found in the doctrine that equity will not
redress a wrong where he who invokes its aid is a wrongdoer.44 Admission of
illegally obtained evidence, it has been asserted, would breed contempt for law
and in the last analysis hinder successful prosecution.4S It is, for example, well
known that police testimony is often rejected by juries because of a widely
entertained belief that illegal methods are used to secure the evidence. And if
officers are compelled to abstain from improper methods for securing evidence,
pressure is exerted upon them to exercise intelligence and imagination. The
6
common-law remedies against the offending officer are hopelessly inadequate.4
39 People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. i3, i5o N.E. 585 (1926).
40 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2184 (3d ed., 1940).

41The first blows at unreasonable searches and seizures were struck in suits for false arrest.
See Entick v. Carrington, ig How. St. Tr. 1029 (1765); Wilkes v. Wood, xg How. St. Tr. 1153
(1763); and see Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and Seizures, 34 Harv. L. Rev. 361, 363 (i921).
42 Harno, Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search and Seizure, x9 Ill. L. Rev. 303 (1925); but
cf. Atkinson, Admissibility of Evidence Obtained Through Unreasonable Searches and

Seizures,

25

Col. L. Rev.

11, 23 (1925).

43 See

Waite, Public Policy and the Arrest of Felons, 31 Mich. L. Rev. 749 (1933).
44 See Brandeis, J., dissenting in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 47, (1928).
4s See Frankfurter, J., dissenting in Harris v. United States, 67 S. Ct. io98, 1105 (1947).
46See Green, Judge and Jury 338 (1930); Winfield, The Law of Tort 644 (1937). The con-

stitutional remedy appears to be equally unsatisfactory. See Bell v. Hood, 71 F. Supp. 813
(Cal., 1947) (complaint against members of FBI for illegal arrest, false imprisonment, and
and unlawful search and seizure, alleging violation of the Fourth Amendment as the federal
cause of action, is insufficient).
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Innocent persons whose rights have been invaded normally are reluctant to
incur the expense and uncertainty of a suit and courts and juries are not in the
habit of giving substantial damages in civil actions against police officers.47
Criminal sanctions are equally inadequate; the criminal provisions of the Volstead Act45 against unreasonable search and seizure were almost never invoked,
for prosecutors are naturally loathe to proceed against the officers who have
provided them with the convicting evidence. It may be logical to punish both
the guilty defendant and the officer who conducted the illegal search. But as
Justice Holmes observed, the law frequently has much more to do with intuition, prejudices, and superstition then with pure logic.4 9 "It is desirable that
criminals should be detected .... It also is desirable that the government

should not itself foster and pay for other crimes when they are the means by
which the evidence is to be obtained. We have to choose and for my part I think
it a lesser evil that some criminal should escape than that the government should
play an ignoble part.''s°
While abolition of the present rule of evidence would lead to simplicity, such
a course of action appears to have no support among the present members of the
Court. The Court has, however, joined its critics in taking cognizance of the
complexity and uncertainty which has developed in this department of constitutional law. Dissenting in United States v. Harris,Justice Jackson argued that
once a search is permitted to go beyond the person arrested, it is impossible to
draw the line. Justice Jackson contended that no search of the premises should
be permitted without a magistrate's warrant, The result would be that even
contraband in plain sight could not be captured without a writ.
Curiously enough, despite the long standing controversy, it is impossible to
determine whether the rule excluding evidence does in fact result in fewer
unreasonable searches. The efficacy of few of our legal rules has been scientifically demonstrated, and judges, lawyers, and scholars have been content withdiscussing the advisability of one rule rather than another from the viewpoint of
what they believe to be general tendencies. It is clear that the federal rule does
not entirely eliminate such violations. There are no data available on the actual
number of violations in the various states, and a comparison of the number of
cases reaching the appellate courts in the respective jurisdictions which do and
do not exclude the evidence would of course prove nothing. Perhaps the only
area in which a valid study could be made is a jurisdiction both before and
after the rule was changed. An analysis of the impact which the rule has made
might very well prove to be a profitable though complex venture for students
of sociology and the law.
47Fairly typical is Caffiniv. Hermann, 112 Me. 282, 91 Atl. ioo9 (1914) (plaintiff, an illiter-

ate Italian, resisted the illegal seizure of his suitcase by a sheriff, and was struck four or five
times with a blackjack. He recovered two hundred dollars).
48 41 Stat. 3o5 (1919), 27 U.S.C.A. § i et seq. (1927).

49Holmes, The Common Law i (i8go).
soHolmes, J., dissenting in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 469 (1927).

NOTES

The law of searches and seizures is a constant reminder of the high price
which concern for civil liberties may entail. Its protection is normally invoked
by those accused of a crime, and there is little doubt that the amendment restricts the freedom of police in bringing criminals to justice. The framers of the
constitution, however, were probably aware of the cost. The Fourth Amendment was forged in the heat of resentment against police abuse manifested by
the British writs of assistance, and the general search warrants issued in Star
Chamber proceedings to unearth evidence among the papers of political suspects and of authors and printers believed guilty of seditious libel.s' It is significant that the most telling thrust in defense of the federal rule is still being
made by those judges who warn that it stands as a potential defense weapon
against future governments determined to suppress political opposition under
the guise of sedition.s2 Any other view, justice Jackson recently declared, might
obliterate one of the most fundamental distinctions "between a government
S
where officers are under the law, and the police state where they are the law."13
s, See Lasson, History and Development of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution
('937).
S-See Murphy, J., dissenting in Harris v. United States, 67 S.Ct. io98, 1113 (1947);
Hand, J., in United States v. Kirschenblatt, 16 F. 2d 202, 203 (C.C.A. 2d, 1926).
53United States v. Johnson, 68 S.Ct. 367, 371 (1948).

